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LOSS OF CONSORTIUM AND LOSS OF




Montana, like most other jurisdictions, currently recognizes an action
for loss of an injured spouse's consortium.' The right of recovery for loss
of consortium was available originally only to husbands, but a majority of
jurisdictions have extended the right of recovery to all spouses.' Recently,
a few jurisdictions have recognized an action for loss of a child's society3
or for loss of parental society." The vast majority of jurisdictions, how-
ever, do not recognize relational claims in the parent-child relationship
except for loss of a child's services.5 The Montana Supreme Court has not
* The author would like to thank Bari Burke, Professor, School of Law, University of
Montana, Missoula, Montana; Greg Munro, Professor, School of Law, University of Mon-
tana, Missoula, Montana; and Susan Roy, Attorney at law, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson,
Missoula, Montana, for their helpful suggestions and comments. Any errors or omissions are
the author's alone.
1. Bain v. Gleason, __ Mont. -, 726 P.2d 1153 (1986); see also Duffy v. Lipsman-
Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961); Dutton v. Hightower & Lubrecht Constr.
Co., 214 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mont. 1963); Hall v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont.
1967); Johnson v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 597 (D. Mont. 1980); for other jurisdictions
see H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 11.3 at 390 n.12
(abr. 2d ed. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 annot. (1977).
Montana law allows recovery of damages for loss of consortium and loss of society in
wrongful death actions (see Swanson v. Champion Int'l Corp. 197 Mont. 509, 517, 646 P.2d
1166, 1170 (1982)); however, loss of consortium and loss of society in wrongful death actions
is beyond the scope of this comment.
2. Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an In-
jured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 596 (1976); see also Leaphart
& McCann, Consortium: An Action for the Wife, 34 MONT. L. REV. 75, 79 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Howard Frank M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955
(1986); Norvell v. Cuyahoga County Hosp., 11 Ohio App. 3d 70, 463 N.E.2d 111 (1983);
Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975). See Annotation, Parent's Right
to Recover for Loss of Consortium in Connection with Injury to a Child, 54 A.L.R. 4TH 112
(1987). Although some courts use the term "consortium" in the parent-child relationship,
most courts use the term society to denote the absence of a sexual relationship.
4. See, e.g., Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690
(1980); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 691 P.2d 195 (1984); Theama v. Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344
N.W.2d 1502 (1984); See Annotation, Child's Right of Action for Loss of Support, Training,
Parental Attention, or the Like, Against a Third Person Negligently Injuring Parent, 11
A.L.R. 4TH 549 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 563
P.2d 858 (1977); Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal. 3d 138 Cal. Rptr.
315, 563 P.2d 871 (1977); Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 529 N.E.2d 209 (1988); Sizemore v.
Smock, 430 Mich. 283, 422 N.W.2d 666 (1988); Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 124
N.H. 719, 475 A.2d 19 (1984). In Sizemore, the Michigan Supreme Court declined to recog-
nize an action for loss of a child's consortium after having recognized an action for loss of a
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had occasion to decide whether parents and children have the right to
bring an action for loss of society, but this issue will likely confront the
court in the near future.'
The issue of whether parents and children should be entitled to ac-
tions for loss of society has forced courts to reexamine the interests pro-
tected by relational claims of family members and the function of the tort
system in protecting those interests. This comment examines what and
whose interests actions for loss of consortium and society have histori-
cally protected. It asserts that the ways in which courts have chosen to
limit liability reflect antiquated models for human relationships. Further,
this comment asserts that courts should either recognize relational claims
of all family members, or none at all.
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Under the loss of consortium theory, courts allow one spouse to re-
cover damages for relational losses caused by wrongful injury to the
other.' A plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium damages thus derives
from a separate tort claim brought by the plaintiff's injured spouse."
Courts broadly define consortium to include all aspects of the marital re-
lationship, but how courts view the marital relationship itself varies by
jurisdiction.9 Courts uniformly hold that damages for loss of consortium
compensate for impairment to both "material" and "sentimental" aspects
of the marital relationship. 0 While the material aspects correspond to ec-
onomically quantifiable losses, the sentimental aspects refer to those
losses not suitable for market valuation. 1 Though jurisdictions agree that
consortium consists of material and sentimental elements, they do not
always agree on what specific relational elements it comprises. Most juris-
dictions recognizing consortium actions hold that each spouse is entitled
to the other's "society, companionship, affection and sexual relations,"
parent's consortium just seven years earlier. Sizemore, 430 Mich. at -, 422 N.W.2d at 667.
6. In Beery v. Armco Steel Corp., No. CV 87-160-BLG (D. Mont., Memorandum and
Order, May 17, 1988), U.S. District Court Judge James Battin refused plaintiffs' request for
certification to the Montana Supreme Court of the issue of plaintiffs' entitlement to a claim
for loss of parental consortium because plaintiffs had chosen to file in federal court. Id. at 3-
4. Judge Battin granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for loss of parental
consortium in federal court, holding that the issue "should be addressed by the legislature
and not by the judiciary." Id. at 3.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 (1977).
8. See Johnson, 496 F. Supp. at 601.
9. CLARK, supra note 1, § 11.3 at 396.
10. American courts historically separated consortium into "sentimental" and "mate-
rial" elements. See, Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852 (1950); Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 666
(1930). Some courts today, however, use the terms "tangible" and "intangible" in place of
"material" and "sentimental." See CLARK, supra note 1, § 11.1 at 382-83. For clarity, the
terms material and sentimental are used herein.
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the so-called sentimental elements of consortium." In addition to these
elements, some jurisdictions still hold that one spouse is entitled to the
other's "services," which roughly correspond to the material elements of
consortium.'3 Jurisdictions that include services as an element of consor-
tium either view services as consisting of household chores,'4 or, paradoxi-
cally, define services as a "sentimental" element.'" The term "services"
itself thus encompasses both material and sentimental aspects. Women
traditionally performed the services (homemaking chores) for which some
courts still permit recovery.' 6 Those jurisdictions recognizing loss of ser-
vices as an element of consortium thus base recovery on a historical view
of marriage wherein the husband owns the value of his wife's services.'"
Regardless of how they characterize consortium, all courts evaluate the
same factors as proof of impairment of consortium. These factors include
the injured spouse's inability to maintain the home, care for family mem-
bers, procreate, show affection, engage in sexual relations, and participate
in social activities.' 8
In contrast to analysis of the action for loss of spousal consortium,
courts strictly limit other family members' actions. A parent may recover
only to the extent of the loss of a child's services or earnings.'9 Because
most children today do not provide services of economic value to their
parents, the loss of services action is obsolete. 0 A few courts implicitly or
explicitly allow recovery for loss of a child's consortium," defined as "so-
ciety" and "companionship."2 2 Most jurisdictions, however, continue to
hold that the only purpose of this action is to compensate the parent for
economic losses.2 3 Though a few jurisdictions have recognized a child's
action for loss of a parent's consortium, most courts reject these claims."
Those courts recognizing the child's action view parental consortium as
including "nurture" and "guidance" as well as "society" and
"companionship." 25
12. CLARK, supra note 1, § 11.3 at 390. Historically, courts viewed consortium as con-
sisting of society, services, and sexual relations. Siciliano, 124 N.H. at 726, 475 A.2d at 22;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 (1977). Most courts today, however, define consor-
tium as comprising "society, companionship, affection and sexual relations." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 comment f.
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 comment f (1977).
14. See, e.g., Harkins v. Paschall, 348 So. 2d 1019, 1024 (Miss. 1977).
15. See, e.g., Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1984); Burns v. Pepsi-Cola
Metro. Bottling Co., 353 Pa. Super. 571, -, 510 A.2d 810, 812 (1986).
16. See, e.g., Harkins, 348 So. 2d at 1024 (Miss.).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 62, 78-80.
18. CLARK, supra, note 1, § 11.3 at 396-97.
19. Id., § 11.4 at 398.
20. See id. at 399.
21. See cases at id., 399 n.9 (for implicit allowance of recovery) and 399 n.10 (for ex-
plicit allowance of recovery).
22. E.g., Schockley, 66 Wis. 2d at 394, 225 N.W.2d at 495.
23. CLARK, supra note 1, § 11.4 at 399.
24. Id.
25. E.g., Ferriter, 381 Mass. at 516, 413 N.E.2d at 696; see also Thearma, 117 Wis. 2d
1989]
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In sum, tort actions by family members constitute a model of the
family wherein spouses are entitled to an action for loss of consortium,
while parents and children are not. No one would suggest that parents
value their children only for their paper route earnings, or that children
do not value their parents' guidance. The law thus fails to recognize or
protect current family interests. 6 Tort law involving family members per-
sists as an antiquated model for family relationships. Indeed, family
members' relational torts still reflect their historical roots in Roman, Eng-
lish, and nineteenth century American models.
III. HISTORICAL ROOTS
A. The Roman Patriarchal Model
Today's action for loss of consortium stems back to Roman times
when the paterfamilias governed the household, the basic unit of soci-
ety. 7 The Roman version of today's loss of consortium action vindicated
the husband's and father's right to control his wife and children, as well
as all other members of the household. The paterfamilias could bring an
action against anyone who insulted or assaulted his wife, children, slaves
or servants." The theory underlying this action was that household mem-
bers were so closely identified with the paterfamilias that "the wrong was
one to himself." ' Emancipated or independent male members of the
household could bring a direct action for their personal injuries.3 0 Even in
those instances, however, the paterfamilias retained the right to bring an
indirect action for the insult he suffered.3" Women and children had no
right to recover for injury to themselves or others because they had no
individual identity in the eyes of the law.32 Any rights or protections they
enjoyed derived entirely from their male guardians.3 Roman law thus
at 508, 344 N.W.2d at 513.
26. Love, supra note 2, at 601.
27. See Hafen, Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 483, 569
(1983).
28. See 3 BRACTON, Tr. I, f. 115 (quoted in Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36
HARV. L. REV. 663, 664 (1923)):
[O]ne suffers injury not only through his own person, but also through others
whom he has in his household .... as for instance through his children and wife.
So, a man could bring an action for injury done to his wife, but not vice versa. For
it is proper that a wife should be defended by her husband; not the husband by
the wife. And so one suffers injury through those whom he may have in his house-
hold, for instance his servants and his slaves, if violence should be done to them
and they should be beaten, either because of insult to him or because it was to his
interest not to be deprived of their services.
29. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 129 at 980 (1984).
30. Id.
31. Sayre, supra note 28, at 663.
32. See Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MiCH. L. REV. 177,
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protected the relational interests only of the paterfamilias. Further, Ro-
man law defined the interest protected as the reputation of the paterfa-
milias and his right of control over other household members."'
The American loss of consortium claim reflects this patriarchal origin
of relational interests. It is only in the last century that our law has begun
to recognize the relational interests of women. Indeed, the extension of
the right of recovery to women was the first break from the patriarchal
model. The law still does not, however, recognize the relational interests
of children. The notion that the right of recovery is somehow associated
with the right of control over others thus persists.
B. The English Master-Servant Model
In the thirteenth century, English jurists applied the paterfamilias
action wholesale to non-familial master-servant relationships so that mas-
ters could recover for the diminished value of their injured servants.3 5
After tailoring the action to the master-servant relationship, courts even-
tually applied the paterfamilias action to family relationships as well.
These courts analogized the master with the husband and father and the
servant with the wife and children.3 6 English law thus translated the pa-
terfamilias model into the master-servant model finally imposed on fam-
ily relationships. This historical development reflects both the patriarchal
and increasingly proprietary or commercial models of family life in Eng-
lish society.
When English jurists tailored the Roman action to the master-ser-
vant relationship, two distinct types of relational claims emerged, loss of
services and enticement. A master's right of recovery for loss of services
depended on a showing that the defendant inflicted violence on the ser-
vant and that the master thereby suffered a loss of the servant's ser-
vices. 7 The requirements of violence and actual loss of services limited
the master's recovery to damages of a property nature.3 8 The master's
cause of action for loss of services was no different than an action for
trespass against his property or chattel. 3 9
A century later, the Statutes of Labourers gave the master another
possible action in addition to the common law action for loss of services."'
The Statutes provided a master with an action against third parties who
enticed a servant "belonging" to him.4 ' While the common law remedy
34. Sayre, supra note 28, at 664.
35. See id.
36. Lippman, supra note 10, at 653 (for analogy to the wife); Love, supra note 2, at
600 (for analogy to the child).
37. Sayre, supra note 28, at 664.
38. Id.
39. Lippman, supra note 10, at 653.
40. Sayre, supra note 28, at 665. England's fourteenth century Statutes of Labourers
were designed to freeze the status of servants and laborers in the face of a labor shortage
following the Black Plague. Id.
41. Id. at 665-66; Owen, Interference with Trade: The Illegitimate Offspring of an
1989] 353
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protected the master's economic interest in his servant's services, the
statutory remedy created a system of compulsory labor to secure a
master's control over his servants.4 2 The statutory remedy thereby gave
the master a proprietary interest in servants themselves .4
Over the years, courts confused and combined the common law ac-
tion for loss of services and the statutory action for enticement.44 More-
over, English courts applied both theories not only to relationships be-
tween master and servant, but also to relationships between husband and
wife and father and child.4 5 By the eighteenth century, this intermingling
had produced the hybrid actions of per quod consortium amisit, or loss of
a wife's consortium, and per quod servitium amisit, or loss of a child's
services." ' Women had no legal claims for loss of their husbands' consor-
tium or loss of their children's services. 47
The loss of consortium claim protected the husband's legally recog-
nized interest in his relationship with his wife. At common law, marriage
entitled a husband not only to his wife's menial services, but also to her
property, custody or "society," chastity, and sexual services.4 ' Any tres-
pass on these rights gave the husband and master an action based on
damage to his chattel interest in his wife.4 9 The loss of consortium claim
in eighteenth-century England thus portrayed marriage as a master-ser-
vant relationship and a husband's exclusive right to sexual intercourse
with his wife as among the services to which he was entitled."
Beginning in the eighteenth century, courts invoked the loss of ser-
vices theory to protect a father's interest in his child's services and cus-
tody as well.5 1 A father's loss of services was the premise of an action
against a third party who had mistreated or enticed a child.2 Application
of the loss of services action to the father-child relationship arose by anal-
ogy to an aspect of the master-servant relationship, the apprenticeship
model. In return for the support and training of a child, a master or fa-
Illegitimate Tort?, 3 MONASH U.L. REV. 41, 42-43 (1976).
42. See Owen, supra note 41, at 42-43.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 43; Sayre, supra note 28, at 666.
45. Owen, supra note 41, at 43-44.
46. See id. at 44.
47. See CLARK, supra note 1, § 11.3 at 391 (consortium), and § 11.2 at 385 (services).
48. Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2
(1923).
49. Id. Indeed, at English common law wives were classified with servants and both
were considered chattel. Lippman, supra note 10, at 653.
50. See Lippman, supra note 10, at 655-56 (for a discussion of the historical develop-
ment); Owen, supra note 41, at 470. English courts based a husband's action for adultery on
the "fiction" that the adulterer caused him to suffer a loss of his wife's services. A husband,
however, could recover damages from an adulterer even when he could not demonstrate a
loss of his wife's services. The action for criminal conversations thus implicitly permitted a
husband to recover for loss of his wife's sexual services. Lippman, supra note 10, at 656-58.
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ther was entitled to the child's labor or services."3 The loss of services
claim also entitled a father to recover from a third party who had seduced
his daughter." Thus, as in the marital relationship, the law recognized
the father as master and the child as his capital asset.
Today's loss of consortium action still reflects its roots in the master-
servant model. In the marital relationship, some jurisdictions still permit
one spouse to recover the value of the other's lost services.55 The master-
servant model is even more apparent in the law governing parent-child
relationships where the law permits recovery only for loss of the child's
earnings or services. As a result of the persistence of the master-servant
analogy, American courts have characterized relational interests as prop-
erty interests. 6
C. The American "Separate Spheres" Model
In the nineteenth century, American courts adopted the English ac-
tions for loss of consortium and loss of services. At first, courts recognized
the rights only of husbands and fathers.5 7 As married women gained the
right to own property, make contracts, and sue,58 however, courts began
to consider whether a wife had a right to recover for loss of her husband's
consortium and whether a mother had a right to recover for loss of her
child's services.
American courts first treated "consortium" as a contractual right
that vested upon marriage.5 While the judiciary insisted on the one hand
that the law regard marriage as nothing more than a private civil con-
tract, on the other it dictated the parties' rights and obligations in the
contract.6 The courts generally agreed on the "terms" of the marriage
contract: each spouse had a right to the other's society, companionship,
affection, sexual intercourse, and fidelity."' In addition, under the mar-
riage contract, a wife was entitled to her husband's support, and a hus-
band was entitled to his wife's "services.'62 The legal treatment of consor-
tium as a right deriving from a marriage contract thus invented the
fiction that in marriage a husband "bought" his wife's services and a wife
"sold" her services in exchange for support. While the master-servant
53. Id. at 45-46.
54. Id.
55. E.g., Madison, 348 N.W.2d. at 206 (Iowa); Harkins, 348 So. 2d at 1024 (Miss.);
Burns, 353 Pa. Super. at __, 510 A.2d at 812.
56. See Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 460-63 (1934) (for discussion).
57. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 124 at 924.
58. The Married Women's Property Acts attempted to abolish the common law disa-
bilities of married women by granting them independent rights to own and control property,
bring suit, and manage their own earnings. Holbrook, supra note 48, at 1, 4; see also CLARK,
supra note 1, § 7.2 at 289-90.
59. Lippman, supra note 10, at 651.
60. Id.; M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 18-21 (1985).
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analysis of marriage translated the paterfamilias action into English law,
the contract analysis of marriage translated the master-servant action
into American law. Though transformed, the paterfamilias and master-
servant models thus persisted in contract analysis of the marital
relationship.
The characterization of marriage as a contract, entitling a husband to
his wife's services and a wife to her husband's support, reflects the "sepa-
rate spheres" and functions assigned to men and women during the In-
dustrial Revolution." In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, the law adopted a model of the family wherein men earned the
family's livelihood in the workplace and women maintained the home and
reared children." Regardless of what men and women actually did, ac-
cording to the legal fiction, men occupied the public sphere of the work-
place, and women occupied the private sphere of the home. 5 The hus-
band was not only the breadwinner, but also remained master of the
home even though he bore no responsibility for the home's creation."
The wife remained his servant as nurturer of both her husband and her
husband's children. 7 Finally, while men braved the corrupting influence
of the public sphere, women were responsible for fostering the family's
spiritual and moral health.68
Courts perpetuated the supposed separate spheres of male and fe-
male life in the loss of consortium action. The law limited a wife's right to
recover for loss of her husband's consortium to those situations where, by
suing, she fulfilled her perceived function of exerting moral influence over
the marital relationship. For example, a wife could sue someone who se-
63. For a discussion of the separate spheres of men and women in nineteenth century
America see Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499-500 (1983) and N. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD 64-74 (1977).
64. GROSSBERG, supra note 60, at 27, 300.
65. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140-41 (1872) (Bradley, J., concur-
ring); Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908); see also Olsen, supra note 6, at 1499;
COTT, supra note 63, at 64-74 (1977).
66. GROSSBERG, supra note 60, at 27, 300.
67. See, e.g., Indianapolis & Martinsville Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder, 51 Ind. App.
533, 546, 100 N.E. 101, 106 (1912):
These services may . . . include such services as might be rendered by hired ser-
vants, which have a fixed value or market value, but they also include such ser-
vices as a wife alone can render the husband.., such as she may extend to him by
way of her society and counsel, her pervading superintendence and care over his
household, [and] her nurture, guidance and training of his children ....
See also, GROSSBERG, supra note 60, at 27, 300.
68. See Olsen, supra note 63, at 1499: "The home was said to provide a haven from
the anxieties of modern life-'a shelter for those moral and spiritual values which the com-
mercial spirit . . . [was] threatening to destroy.' " For a discussion of how the forces of
industrialization "disestablished" middle-class women, see A. DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION
OF AMERICAN CULTURE 50-94 (1977). According to Douglas, women who previously labored in
communal situations lost recognition as economic producers and assumed a "sentimental"
role as moral reformers in a society disturbed by the consequences of laissez-faire industrial
expansion. Id. at 12, 55-59.
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duced her husband, 69 repeatedly sold opium to him against her protests
7 0
or who "intentionally" or "maliciously" tried to destroy the marriage.
7
'
Courts thus permitted a wife to recover for loss of her husband's society
and companionship only in situations where the defendant "induced
72
her husband to behave in a manner that threatened to destroy the integ-
rity of the marital relationship. A wife could recover in these situations
because her husband had no interest in bringing his own action, and usu-
ally shared culpability with the defendant.
7
While a wife thus had a limited consortium claim for the purpose of
detering a corruptive defendant, the law did not permit her to sue in situ-
ations where, by suing, she appeared to challenge her husband's authority
over her. A wife, therefore, could not sue for loss of her husband's consor-
tium if he had a right to bring his own action.7 4 Even if the husband did
not have his own action, a wife could not recover for loss of his support or
services.7 5 Such claims would have suggested that a wife had control over
her husband and the economic affairs of the family, in direct conflict with
"separate spheres" ideology. 75 Only by appearing to sue for the purpose of
preserving the marital relationship could a wife indirectly protect her
right to the support of her husband.77
A husband, on the other hand, could recover for loss of his wife's
consortium in as many ways as he could under English common law.
Whereas under English common law courts awarded damages for loss of
services, sexual relations, and society, American courts typified the hus-
band's injury predominantly as one for loss of services.7 8 Nonetheless,
such services often implicitly included society, affection, and sexual inter-
course. 79 Though the Married Women's Property Acts gave women the
69. Lippman, supra note 10, at 662-63.
70. E.g., Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912); Moberg v.
Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917).
71. E.g. Work v. Campbell, 164 Cal. 343, 128 P. 943 (1913); Wallace v. Wallace, 85
Mont. 492, 279 P. 374 (1929). American courts apparently modeled the action for intentional
or malicious interference, "alienation of affections," on the theory of tortious inducement of
breach of contract. If the defendant caused one spouse to lose affection for the other, then
the defendant's conduct amounted to an inducement to breach the marriage contract. See
Lippman, supra note 10, at 660; Owen, supra note 41, at 41, 47.
72. Lippman, supra note 10, at 660.
73. Holbrook, supra note 48, at 6.
74. Id.
75. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813, 814; Note, The Case of the Lonely Nurse: The Wife's
Action for Loss of Consortium, 18 W. RESERVE L. REV. 621, 629 (1967) (authored by Marian
F. Ratnoff).
76. GROSSERG, supra note 60, at 27, 300; see also Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 140-
41.
77. See Annotation, Wife's Right to Sue for Loss of Consortium, 5 A.L.R. 1049-50
(1920).
78. See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813-14.
79. See Denver Consol. Tramway Co. v. Riley, 14 Colo. App. 132, -, 59 P. 476, 479
(1899): "The wife does not occupy the position of a servant, and her services to her husband
are not those of a servant. She makes his home inviting, and ministers to his happiness in a
multitude of ways outside the drudgery of household labor." See also Indianapolis, 51 Ind.
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right to their own earnings, courts continued to hold that the husband,
not the wife, owned a wife's household services."s A husband could thus
recover for loss of his wife's services regardless of whether she maintained
her own action.8' Meanwhile, courts seldom permitted a wife to recover
for loss of her husband's consortium. Though the marriage contract enti-
tled a wife to her husband's support, her husband's earnings were viewed
as his property alone, and courts reasoned that permitting a wife to re-
cover for loss of her husband's support would lead to double recovery.8"
Furthermore, courts denied a wife the right to recover for loss of her hus-
band's services on grounds that the marriage contract did not entitle her
to his services.83 Finally, though the marriage contract entitled a wife to
her husband's society, she could not recover for loss of this aspect of the
relationship because courts predicated recovery for loss of society on the
right to recover for loss of services.8 4
In sharp contrast to the law's denial of the wife's right to recover for
loss of her husband's services or support, courts continued to treat a
wife's services as the property of her husband. The husband's loss of con-
sortium action for his wife's services epitomized his presumed authority
over the home and his essential ownership of his wife's services. Indeed,
by implicitly permitting husbands to recover for loss of their wives' sexual
services and denying wives such a claim, courts conferred on husbands
ownership of their wives' bodies as well.8 The disparate treatment of
husbands and wives reflected a key concept of the separate spheres ideol-
ogy, that men dominated not only the public sphere, but also the private
sphere of the home.
Eventually, courts uniformly held that a wife could base consortium
actions on intentional conduct by a defendant, but that she could not
recover for negligently inflicted injury.86 Meanwhile, courts permitted a
husband to recover for loss of a wife's consortium whether defendant ac-
ted negligently or intentionally.8 7 This distinction helped courts to justify
the disparate treatment the separate spheres analysis imposed. The dis-
App. at 546, 100 N.E.2d at 106; Lippman, supra note 10, at 656, 666-67, 673.
80. See Shaw v. Shaw, 122 Mont. 593, 613, 208 P.2d 514, 524 (1949): "It is the duty of
the wife without compensation to attend to all the ordinary household duties and labor
faithfully in the advancement of her husband's interests." See also Holbrook, supra note 48,
at 6-7.
81. Holbrook, supra note 48, at 7-8.
82. See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814.
83. See id. at 813.
84. See id. at 813, 814 (for a discussion of how courts predicated recovery for loss of
society on the right to loss of services).
85. See Lippman, supra note 10, at 651, 656, 658. The contract theory of marriage still
permits spouses to exercise sexual contract rights. For example in Favrot v. Barns, 332 So.
2d 873, 875 (La. App. 1976), the court held that the contract of marriage obligated spouses
to fulfill the reasonable and normal sexual desires of the other. Id. at 875. A contract right
to sexual relations is eerily akin to the historical ownership of a wife's body.
86. See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 816; see also Holbrook, supra note 48, at 7.
87. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 816; see also Holbrook, supra note 48, at 7, and Lippman,
supra note 10, at 666.
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tinction also led, however, to further complications in common law defini-
tions of consortium damages.
When women won the right to sue at all, courts began to bifurcate
the "sentimental" from the "material" elements of consortium damages,8"
and to place greater importance on the "material." 89 Courts explained, for
example, that the damages contemplated in intentional tort actions to
which women were entitled were "sentimental," and that the damages
contemplated in negligent tort actions, to which men were entitled, were
"material." 90 Thus, courts did not allow a wife to recover for loss of her
husband's society and affection because these damages had a "sentimen-
tal" value to her. By contrast, courts allowed a husband to recover for loss
of his wife's society and affection because courts perceived these damages
as "material" to him. The notion that the husband's society had a senti-
mental value to his wife and that the wife's society had a material value
to her husband again reflected the separate sphere schism between the
female private and the male public domains. As a consequence of the sep-
arate spheres ideology, the law arbitrarily and illogically separated con-
sortium into "material" and "sentimental" elements and treated a wife's
society as a "material" element inseparable from her services.
By permitting a husband to recover for loss of a wife's services,
American courts perpetuated aspects of the paterfamilias and master-
servant models. The early American consortium action portrayed mar-
riage as essentially a master-servant relationship, and consortium as es-
sentially a relational commodity. The characterization of marriage as a
contract entitling a husband to his wife's services and a wife to her hus-
band's support, the subordination of the private sphere and interests to
the public, and the valuation of material relational interests over senti-
mental relational interests reflected not only the subordination of wives
to their husbands, but also the subordination of relational interests in the
"female" sphere to those in the "male" sphere. Today's loss of consortium
claim, with its distinction between material and sentimental damages,
still reflects this archaic subordination of sentimental to material inter-
ests. Moreover, only in the last forty years have courts recognized a wife's
right to recover sentimental damages for loss of consortium, and courts
still do not recognize the right of parents and children to recover senti-
mental damages.
D. The Modern Consortium Action
It was not until the 1950s that American courts began to allow a wife
to recover for loss of consortium resulting from negligent injury to her
husband. In the landmark case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,91 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the assertion that
88. See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813-14; see also Lippman, supra note 10, at 666-67.
89. See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813.
90. See id.
91. 183 F.2d 811, 812-13 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
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loss of services was a necessary or even predominant factor in an action
for loss of consortium.2 The Hitaffer court held that the various damages
comprising consortium are "welded together into a conceptualistic unity"
and that the separation of these elements into the sentimental and mate-
rial was "arbitrary" and unfounded.9 3 The Hitaffer court viewed the mar-
riage contract as creating a "legally protected interest," and reasoned that
both negligent and intentional invasions of marital interests were actiona-
ble by both spouses.94 The Hitaffer decision thus established that the
marital relationship entitled wives as well as husbands not only to the
other's "material services," but also to the other's "companionship, love,
felicity, and sexual relations."95 The majority of jurisdictions, including
Montana,9" eventually followed the Hitaffer court's lead.9
Despite its more realistic view of the loss a spouse suffers when the
other is injured, the Hitaffer court nevertheless perpetuated aspects of
the separate spheres model. Though the Hitaffer court attempted to es-
tablish gender equality in consortium actions by permitting both men and
women to recover for both material and sentimental elements, it contin-
ued to view consortium as a right deriving from a contract of marriage.
The Hitaffer court reasoned that the right to the conjugal society of one's
spouse "spring[s] from the marriage contract" and that "[a]ny interfer-
ence with these rights .... is a violation, not only of natural right, but
also of [the] legal right arising out of the marriage relation."9 8
Like the Hitaffer court, the Montana Supreme Court has viewed the
right to spousal consortium as arising from the duties and obligations im-
plied in the marriage contract. In Bain v. Gleason, the Montana Supreme
Court bolstered its contract view of marriage by reference to the Montana
statute specifying that spouses have "obligations of mutual respect, fidel-
ity, and support."99 The court, however, based the right of one spouse to
recover for loss of the other's "aid, protection, affection and society"
neither on the parties' view of their marriage contract, nor on the rights
and responsibilities the state imposes as a third party to the marriage
contract.'00 Rather, the Montana Supreme Court followed the American
common law in basing consortium rights on a marital contract, the terms
92. Id. at 814. Although the Hitaffer court was not the first to recognize a wife's
action for loss of consortium (see Holbrook, supra note 48, at 8), most jurisdictions in the
United States that had previously refused to recognize the wife's action eventually followed
the Hitaffer decision. See Annotation, Wife's Right of Action for Loss of Consortium, 36
A.L.R. 3d 900 (1971) [hereinafter Wife's Right of Action].
93. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814.
94. Id. at 817.
95. Id. at 814. The Hitaffer court viewed the husband's material services as both his
duty of support and his role as his wife's "advisor and counselor." Id. at 819.
96. Bain, - Mont. at -, 726 P.2d at 1155.
97. See Wife's Right of Action, supra note 92.
98. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 816.
99. Bain, - Mont. at -, 726 P.2d at 1155.
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of which courts presume.'"' Like other courts, the Montana Supreme
Court presumes that every marriage has certain relational attributes.
Montana law thus compensates spouses for loss of those attributes be-
cause of the legal fiction that, absent a marriage contract, these relational
aspects would not exist.'
The American common law characterization of consortium as a con-
tractual right reflects a "male" model of the family. Carol Gilligan, often
cited in feminist legal critiques, has studied the difference between men's
and women's perceptions of human relationships.'013 Legal scholars apply-
ing Gilligan's research conclude that men tend to "define morality and
justice in the vocabulary of rights . . ." and to resolve conflicts by "ab-
stracting human relationships from their particular contexts .... ",0o
Men, therefore, "typically see their relationships with others in contrac-
tual terms, as derived from arms' length dealings among lonely contend-
ers for places on the ladder of hierarchy."' 1 5 Women, by contrast, tend to
"define morality and justice in the language of responsibility" and to re-
solve conflicts by "preserving human relationships."' 0' 6 Women, accord-
ingly, are not as interested in applying abstract and hierarchical rules as
they are in fostering human "connectedness."'' 0 As one commentator has
observed, Gilligan's identification of men's and women's perceptions par-
allels the nineteenth century ideology of the distinct functions and attrib-
utes of American men and women.'08 Moreover, Gilligan's images of the
"ladder of hierarchy" and the "web of connection" correspond to the
"separate spheres" ideology of American jurisprudence. 10 9 According to
the "separate spheres" ideology, contractual relationships characterize
the public, "male" sphere, and service to and connectedness with others
characterize the "female" sphere."0 Basing consortium rights on a con-
tract model thus betrays greater valuation of relationships based in the
"male" sphere than of relationships based in the "female" sphere, and
further, reflects a "male" model of the family.
The most obvious instance of courts imposing the male contract
101. See Lippman, supra note 10, at 651.
102. Note that the definition of consortium used today in Montana traces back to a
1929 case for alienation of affections, Wallace v. Wallace, 85 Mont. 492, 279 P. 374 (1929).
103. The following discussion employs generalizations about ways of perceiving de-
noted "male" and "female." This characterization by gender, however, is not intended to
suggest that individual men and women perceive in these ways.
104. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 483 (citing C. GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 483-84.
107. Id.
108. See Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 585-86 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 63-68, for
discussion.
109. See Sherry, supra note 108, at 590-91; see also Karst, supra note 104, at 481-86.
Gilligan "evokes two contrasting images: for men, the ladder of hierarchy; for women, the
web of connection." Karst, supra note 104, at 462.
110. See Sherry, supra note 108, at 590-91; see also Karst, supra note 104, at 481-86.
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model on family relationships is their insistence upon a marriage contract
as a condition precedent to a consortium claim. In Gonzales v. Hudson,'
the California Supreme Court held that one partner had no right to a
consortium claim where a couple had lived together for thirteen years and
had two children.' The Gonzales court refused to base recovery solely
on the "psychological and emotional relationship between a man and a
woman." ' 3 The court reasoned that the foundation of society depends on
the institution of marriage,' 1 4 that courts must draw a line between liabil-
ity and nonliability somewhere,"" and that a test to determine whether a
relationship had the characteristics of a marriage would be vague and in-
viting of "mischief.""' 6 While a concern for limiting liability may have
motivated the Gonzales court, the court's unwillingness to permit recov-
ery for "sentimental" losses absent a formal marriage contract implies
that sentimental aspects have no value absent a contract for support and
services. The Gonzales decision thus reflects a greater valuation of the
contract model of relationships founded in the male sphere than on mod-
els of relationships founded in the female sphere.
E. The Modern Loss of Services and Society Action
By the early twentieth century, to compensate parents for injuries to
children, most American jurisdictions had adopted the English loss of ser-
vices action. ' 7 At first, American courts recognized only a father's claim
for loss of his child's services." 8 After passage of the Married Women's
Property Acts, courts permitted a mother as well to sue for loss of her
child's services, but courts subordinated a mother's right to the father's
right. 19 Just as a wife could sue for loss of her husband's consortium only
when her husband had no interest in his own action, a mother could sue
for loss of her child's services only when her husband was unable to bring
suit himself.'2 ° Eventually, courts placed the mother's right on equal foot-
ing with the father's.'2
American courts at the turn of the century based the loss of services
action on an implied contract between parent and child. Just as in the
judiciary's interpretation of the marriage contract, courts explicitly based
parents' right to recover damages for loss of a child's services on the
master-servant relationship."' The law entitled a parent to a child's labor
111. Gonzales v. Hudson, 200 Cal. App. 3d 45, 245 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1988).
112. Id. at -' 245 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
113. Id. at -, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
114. Id. at -' 245 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
115. Id. at -' 245 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
116. Id. at -, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
117. Love, supra note 2, at 599.
118. CLARK, supra note 1, § 11.4 at 398.
119. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 125 at 935.
120. Id.
121. CLARK, supra note 1, § 11.4 at 399.
122. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted, "the measure of damages in such a 14
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and earnings in supposed return for the parent's support and education
of the child.' 3 Primary in this analysis of parental recovery was the prin-
ciple that the child's earning capacity belonged to the parent as long as
the child was a minor.'"4 Courts denied a parent compensation for senti-
mental losses because the law treated the parent-child relationship as the
equivalent of a master-servant or master-apprentice relationship.', 5 Some
jurisdictions did permit a parent's recovery for loss of a child's society
and affection as "parasitic" to damages for loss of services when the de-
fendant intentionally abducted, enticed, or seduced the child.'2 6 Courts
did not permit recovery for loss of society and affection, however, when
the defendant negligently deprived the parent or master of a child's ser-
vices.' 7 This distinction between damages for negligence and those for
intentional torts paralleled the distinction courts drew between consor-
tium damages for husbands and wives. As in consortium, by recognizing
loss of a child's services, courts endorsed the "male" contract model of
the parent-child relationship. Also, as in consortium, by failing to recog-
nize sentimental losses in all but circumscribed instances, courts devalued
the relational interests of the "female" sphere.
Today, the loss of services action is, of course, obsolete.'2 8 The com-
mon law doctrine for loss of services originated in a time when the eco-
nomic system could not have survived without child labor.' 9 Children to-
day, however, are no longer economic assets to the family, but rather are
causes of great expenditure.3 0 Not only have social and economic changes
case is the same as that which obtains in a case brought by a master for the loss of services
of his servant or apprentice." McGarr v. National & Providence Worsted Mills, 24 R.I. 447,
453, 53 A. 320, 325 (1902). See also Love, supra note 2, at 599-600.
123. GROSSBERG, supra note 60, at 259. Indeed, parents were equated with masters. Id.
124. See Annotation, What Items of Damage on Account of Personal Injury to Infant
Belong to Him and What to Parent, 37 A.L.R. 11 (1925).
125. McGarr, 24 R.I. at 453, 53 A. at 325-26; Green, supra note 56, at 482.
126. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, § 124 at 924-28.
127. Id. § 125 at 934.
128. See CLARK, supra note 1, § 11.2 at 385.
129. Shockley, 66 Wis. 2d at 400, 225 N.W.2d at 499, (quoting Katz, Schroeder, and
Sidman, Emancipating Our Children-Coming of Legal Age in America, 7 FAM. L.Q. -,
212-225 (1973):
In colonial America children occupied the lowest rungs of the social ladder....
[C]hildren and servants were treated similarly before the law and were subject to
the harshest punishments for relatively trivial offenses. Apprenticeship "was
merely a specialized form of servitude." Children owed the strictest obedience to
their parents and were expected to assume completely subservient positions
within the family unit. Since child labor was crucial to the economic system, the
parental right to a minor child's services and wages was also a practical necessity.
130. Shockley, 66 Wis. 2d at 339, 225 N.W.2d at 498. "It does not take an advanced
degree in economics to see that it costs much more to raise a child than a child could ever
earn during his or her minority." Siciliano, 124 N.H. at 733-34, 475 A.2d at 27 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The traditional pecuniary loss rule required juries to estimate the value of the
child's services and then subtract the cost of parental support. If this rule were literally
followed today, 'the average child would have a negative worth.' Id. (quoting Selders v. Ar-
mentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 279, 207 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1973)). 15
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rendered the loss of services action obsolete, but so has the changed sta-
tus of the parent-child relationship.' Today, parents value children from
wholly "sentimental" impulses, not for the child's earnings and labor.
No court today would suggest that because the parent-child relation-
ship is equivalent to that of master-servant, parents should not recover
damages for loss of a child's society and companionship. Nevertheless, the
"modern" loss of services action is no different than the early loss of ser-
vices action, and the majority of jurisdictions continues to limit the dam-
ages a parent may recover to those for loss of a child's services."3 2 More-
over, loss of services actions now reflect the law's subordination of the
parent-child relationship to the marital relationship. The Hitaffer princi-
ple assured that spouses could recover for sentimental losses. Arguably,
then, consortium actions protect modern interests in the marital relation-
ship. Most courts have yet failed, however, to endorse and protect the
modern parent-child relationship by compensating for "sentimental"
losses in this realm. Current law thus denigrates the value of the parent-
child relationship in contrast to the value of the marital relationship.
IV. CURRENT RELATIONAL INTERESTS
Current relational tort claims still reflect their historical origins in
the paterfamilias, master-servant, and contract models of family relation-
ships. Today's law portrays a family model wherein "material" relational
interests are more valuable than "sentimental" relational interests, and
relationships founded on contract (such as marriage) are more valuable
than those that are not (such as the parent-child relationship). The law
thus recognizes the relational interests of the "male" sphere and devalues
relational interests of the "female" sphere.
The law's description of current relational interests in the family
does not comport with actual current values or relational interests. When
a family member is severely injured, other members of the family suffer
primarily a sentimental loss, not a loss of earnings or services. Though the
law recognizes the sentimental losses of spouses, it still does not recognize
the sentimental losses of parents and children. Furthermore, a family
member suffers this loss when the other is severely injured regardless of
whether an explicit or implicit contract for support and services estab-
lishes their relationship. Courts' reasoning that sentimental losses are
based on contract suggests that sex, affection, and love are relational
commodities bought and sold in the marketplace.
Courts' justification of the contract model, that the marital relation-
ship is the foundation of society,'33 is prescriptive, not descriptive. Nearly
half of all marriages end in divorce. 34 The parent-child relationship, on
131. Shockley, 66 Wis. 2d at 400, 225 N.W.2d at 499.
132. Love, supra note 2, at 633.
133. Gonzales, 200 Cal. App. 3d at -, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 756; Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at -,
529 N.E.2d at 214.
134. Note, Child Support Enforcement in Montana, 50 MONT. L. REV. 165, 165 n.2
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the other hand, endures a lifetime. In addition, single parents head
twenty-percent of all American families. 35 Arguably, then, the parent-
child relationship is more important to the well being of our society than
the spousal relationship. Moreover, children's dependence on their par-
ents further supports the imperative to value the parent-child relation-
ship as much if not more than the spousal relationship. Though our law
views children as autonomous individuals,"3 6 children are dependent upon
their parents or guardians for any rights and entitlements that our law
guarantees. Furthermore, the state must rely on parents to assure that
children receive the attention, guidance, and emotional support they re-
quire to become productive and ethical members of society. Spouses, by
contrast, have a direct relationship with the state and can look to it inde-
pendently for protection of their rights. As a consequence of devaluation
of relational interests in the female sphere, however, family members' tort
claims fail to recognize these critical current relational interests.
V. THE CURRENT DEBATE
In the last fifteen years a number of jurisdictions have considered
whether to allow damages for loss of a child's or parent's society. Courts
recognizing actions in the parent-child relationship seek to evaluate inju-
ries in light of changing social and economic conditions. 37 Some courts
have, therefore, rejected the notion that a parent values a child only for
the economic value of the child's labor.'38 Moreover, at least one court has
refused to limit recovery to the age of majority, reasoning that such a
limitation reflects the archaic loss of services model.'3 9 Limiting an action
to a child's minority fails to value a child's companionship and society
which endure beyond the age of majority.146 Further, some courts have
recognized a child's action for loss of a parent's society because of the
child's dependency, 4' "rooted not only in economic requirements, but
also in [a child's] needs for closeness, guidance and nurture."" 2
Beginning with the California cases of Borer v. American Airlines"43
(1989) (authored by Thomas W. Christie). Sociologists anticipate that 49% of all marriages
will fail. Id.
135. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 43 (1988). Over 80% of all single parents are women. Id.
136. See GROSSBERG, supra note 60, at 24, for a discussion of how American law em-
phasizes the individual.
137. E.g., Shockley, 66 Wis. 2d at 399-401, 225 N.W.2d at 498-99; Howard Frank,
M.D., P.C., 150 Ariz. at 231, 722 P.2d at 959.
138. Shockley, 66 Wis. 2d at 407, 225 N.W.2d at 500.
139. Howard Frank, M.D., P.C., 150 Ariz. at 231, 722 P.2d at 958.
140. Id. at 233, 722 P.2d at 960 (1986). In a recent federal case, the court recognized a
parent's constitutionally protected right to the companionship of an adult married child.
Agresta v. Sambor, 687 F. Supp. 162, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
141. See Berger, 411 Mich. at 17, 303 N.W.2d at 427; Ferriter, 381 Mass. at 515-16,
413 N.E.2d at 695.
142. Ferriter, 381 Mass. at 516, 413 N.E.2d at 696.
143. 19 Cal.3d 440, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858.
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and Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles,' 14 however, several jurisdic-
tions have recently denied parents and children consortium actions.145
These courts assert that money cannot compensate loss of society and
companionship"" and that the difficulty of measuring damages for senti-
mental losses risks double recovery."" Money may not compensate par-
ent-child relational losses in reality, but money does not compensate for
most losses recognized in the tort system."" Awarding damages for loss of
society and companionship is no more difficult than awarding damages
for emotional distress, for example." 9 Furthermore, the double recovery
argument did not succeed in preventing courts from awarding damages
for sentimental losses to wives, and it is just as unpersuasive, therefore,
for parent-child losses. Just because market models cannot readily mea-
sure a loss does not mean that courts should not recognize the value.' 50
Courts that refuse to value the parent-child relationship legally because
damages cannot be precisely measured place greater importance on the
means of justice than on the just end. The tort system, or means, itself
forms part of the "male" sphere, recognizing and compensating "senti-
mental" relational losses, the end, is associated with the "female"
sphere.' 5 ' By placing greater value on the means of measuring damages
than on the social values the law might reflect in recognizing sentimental
losses of parents and children, courts implicitly continue to devalue rela-
tional interests in the "female" sphere and perpetuate a reflexive gender
bias.
A fear of ballooning litigation particularly motivates these courts to
draw the line at such claims. For example, these courts assert that the
expense of litigating nonmarital relational claims would overburden
courts, that payment for loss of consortium in these claims would over-
burden society, and that the general public would bear the brunt of these
burdens in higher insurance costs." 2 Once courts recognize parent and
child losses of consortium, these courts predict, the "floodgates" of litiga-
tion would burst with grandmothers', grandfathers', brothers', and sisters'
claims. 13 Illogically, such concerns for efficient judicial administration do
not obtain in analysis of marital relational claims. Instead, courts have
attempted to distinguish marital relational claims from parent-child rela-
tional claims in order to justify denial of parents' and children's claims.
144. 19 Cal.3d 461, 138 Cal.Rptr. 315, 563 P.2d 871.
145. E.g., Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 529 N.E.2d 209; Sizemore, 430 Mich. 283, 422 N.W.2d
666; Siciliano, 124 N.H. 719, 475 A.2d 19.
146. Baxter, 19 Cal. 3d at 464, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 317, 563 P.2d at 873.
147. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307, 563 P.2d at 863.
148. Sizemore, 430 Mich. at 307, 422 N.W.2d at 677 (Archer, J., dissenting); Siciliano,
124 N.H. at 737, 475 A.2d at 30 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
149. Siciliano, 124 N.H. at 737, 475 A.2d at 30 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
150. Sizemore, 430 Mich. at 312, 422 N.W.2d at 680 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
151. See Karst, supra note 104, at 462.
152. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 447, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306, 563 P.2d at 862; Sizemore, 430
Mich. at 295, 422 N.W.2d at 672.
153. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at -, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
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Courts suggest, for example, that the spousal relationship can be distin-
guished from the parent-child relationship because of the absence of a
sexual relationship in the latter"5 4 and because the marital relationship is
somehow more important to society.'55
Though courts must weigh the detriment of imposing another layer
of liability on society against the benefit of recognizing parent-child
claims, they should refrain from limiting recovery by relying on anti-
quated legal models that degrade human relationships. Under prevailing
contract theory, denying recovery to parents and children based on the
absence of a sexual relationship suggests that sex is a "material" interest
and ignores the sentimental aspects of both the spousal and parent-child
relationship. Further, the holding of some courts, that recovery for loss of
a parent's or child's consortium is limited to the child's minority, reflects
a view of the relational interests of parents and children as mere aspects
of a master-servant contract.
Courts rejecting tort actions of parents and children ultimately con-
clude that the social interest in limiting liability outweighs the individ-
ual's interest in receiving compensation.' 56 Yet few courts have refused to
entertain a husband's action for loss of his wife's consortium.'5 7 To pro-
tect the relational interests of some family members while denying pro-
tection for others, courts have gone to great lengths to make distinctions
that form degrading and anachronistic models for family relationships. In
light of the separate spheres ideology, the failure of our law to recognize
the sentimental interests of parents and children yet reflects a fundamen-
tal gender bias.
VI. TOWARD REDEFINING RELATIONAL INTERESTS
In the interest of limiting liability, courts have perpetuated anti-
quated and degrading legal models for family relationships. The rela-
tional interests currently recognized by the law in the loss of consortium
and services actions are contractual, proprietary, materialistic, and indi-
vidualistic. Though courts eventually extended to wives the common law
right of husbands to recover for "sentimental" as well as "material"
losses, current law refuses to recognize the sentimental relational interests
of parents and children.
We should seek to fashion a tort system that reflects our present-day
relational values. If the law is to recognize relational interests at all, it
should recognize those kinship bonds that encourage the growth and de-
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velopment of family members regardless of their net worth. Recognizing
the relational interests of spouses while refusing to recognize the rela-
tional interests of parents and children is instead a sorry denial of those
kinship bonds. Current tort law suggests that a spousal relationship is
more important than a parent-child relationship. Further, in light of the
traditional functions assigned to men and women, family tort actions sug-
gest that breadwinning and providing emotional support and services to
breadwinners is more important than parenting. Family members' tort
law thus conveys a message that the economic support of a family,
whether by earning a wage or by homemaking, is more important than
the social and emotional development of its members.
To repudiate this current model, courts should extend the loss of
consortium action to parents and children. The law should recognize that
family members depend on each other for emotional as well as economic
support, and that a family member suffers a deep loss when another fam-
ily member is severely injured. Extending tort compensation for damages
only to parents and children would not open the floodgates of litigation.
The spousal and parent-child relationships are the basis of the American
family, and therefore, courts need not extend the right to recover rela-
tional damages any further.' 8 We can recognize that the parent-child re-
lationship, as well as the spousal, forms the foundation of our society
without denigrating other kinship relations. Further, recognition of the
sentimental losses of parents and children in consortium actions parallels
other developments in family tort law. Family members, including par-
ents and children, can now recover damages for the emotional shock of
witnessing injury to another family member,' 59 and can recover damages
for grief caused by the wrongful death of a family member.'6 ° It makes
little sense to recognize the legitimacy of these claims without also recog-
nizing the loss of society claims of parents and children.
Denying claims of parents and children is not the only way to limit
liability. Because our law emphasizes the rights of individuals rather than
the "relationship among individuals,"'S'courts presume that recognizing
the rights of parents and children in addition to those of spouses will
result in a multiplication of claims and an explosion of damages. 6 2 This
result arises, however, because courts treat relational interests as "indi-
vidual" interests rather than as interests of the group to which the in-
jured party belongs.1 63 Courts' concern for limiting liability and prevent-
ing double recovery can be addressed, therefore, by recognizing the injury
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suffered by the kinship unit as a whole, rather than by adjudicating the
isolated claims of every member. ' 4 By first examining the injury to the
group as a whole, and then devising a system for distributing the award
among individual members, courts could avoid the potential problems of
double recovery and extended liability.
On the other hand, the tort system may simply be unable to protect
relational interests at all.'6 5 One court observed that in parents' loss of
consortium claims, parents would have to present evidence of diminution
of the value of their child's society and companionship resulting from the
injury.166 Said the court, "a parent's interest in minimizing the value of a
living child contrasts sharply with the situation in a wrongful death ac-
tion, where the opposite claim is made and loss is presumed."' 6 7 Nonethe-
less, courts entertain evidence of the diminution of an injured spouse's
value. Therefore, if courts refuse to recognize the claims of parents and
children, then they should deny the claims of spouses as well. Denial of
all family members' claims-spouses, parents, and children-would
merely constitute the admission that the tort system cannot appropri-
ately value relational claims. Moreover, by abolishing the spousal loss of
consortium action, courts would repudiate the materialistic and patriar-
chal concepts on which it is based.
VII. CONCLUSION
Historically, the law defined relational interests according to the
value that men placed on their servants, their wives, and their children.
Though the law has recognized the individual legal identities of women
and children,'68 it has been reluctant to recognize their relational inter-
ests, especially where those interests differ from those traditionally pro-
tected by the law.
The judiciary should strive to analyze relational interests in light of
current family relationships, and not limit its recognition of legal inter-
ests to those based on patriarchal and materialistic concepts that devalue
the interests associated with the "female" sphere. Courts should recognize
the claims of parents and children, as well as those of spouses, because
the parent-child relationship is fundamental to the kinship unit. While
the tort system may not be the best means of recognizing or protecting
these interests among family members, we should not permit the means
of protecting relational interests to determine legal perceptions of family
relationships. If the judiciary must admit the inability of the tort system
164. See Sizemore, 430 Mich. at 311, 422 N.W.2d at 679 n.5 (Archer, J., dissenting).
Courts should "look beyond the idea of rights as personal zones of non-interference to a
conception of justice that recognize[s] our interdependence." Karst, supra note 107, at 471.
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to value the relational interests of parents and children, then it should
abolish all relational claims and the materialistic and patriarchal concepts
upon which they are founded.
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